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In the second part of his article, taken from a book he has co-written on the Act, 
Michael Taylor considers the regulatory reforms introduced by the new 
legislation.
THE CONFLUENCE OF THE THREE 
STREAMS
U nder the impact ot these various factors (as explained in Part I   see Issue 30), the three streams of finance, which had been kept separate 
by custom, practice, and cartels operated by the leading 
institutions, had begun to converge by the mid-1990s. 
From being largely distinct sectors, the banks, building 
societies, unit and investment trusts, and insurance 
companies had become competitors, both as repositories 
of the savings of individuals and as providers of finance. 
The largest UK commercial banks acquired investment 
banking arms, while linkages between banks and insurance
o ' o
companies began to form. Financial conglomerates, 
straddling the banking, securities and insurance sectors, 
thus began to emerge. Parallel to these developments were 
the emergence of new types of financial product which did 
not fit readily into traditional regulatory distinctions; for 
example, futures contracts on the stock indices made it 
possible for insiders to deal or manipulate markets without 
acquiring any of the underlying securities.
One consequence of these developments was that the 
pace of structural change in the industry rapidly began to 
outpace the regulatory structure that had been put in place 
during the 1980s. For example, financial conglomerate 
groups found themselves subject to a plethora of different 
regulatory bodies, which both increased their regulatory 
burden and impeded the ability of any one regulator to 
obtain an overview of their risk profile. One illustration ot 
this problem was the collapse of Barings in 1995, an old- 
established merchant bank that was brought down by 
problems in its securities arm. But there were other, less 
spectacular instances of the strains on the regulatory 
system beginning to show. As a result, a regulatory system
built on assumptions about clear dividing lines between 
different types of financial institution and product was 
increasingly poorly adapted to the realities of the financial 
marketplace as it had evolved by the end of the twentieth 
century. Hence a reconfiguration of regulatory structure, 
the better to reflect these new economic realities, was 
becoming a matter of necessity.
UK DEBATE
The debate in the UK that followed the publication of 
Michael Taylor's report for the Centre for the Study of 
Financial Innovation, Twins Peaks: A Regulatory Structure for 
the New Century, considered some of these issues, although 
it did not do so in the depth of the Commission of Inquiry 
appointed by the Australian government which reported in 
March 1997 and which drew broadly similar conclusions. 
(Financial System Inquiry: Final Report, Canberra, 1997). 
However, there was little sign that this debate had much 
influenced official thinking until the Chancellor's 
statement to the House of Commons on 20 May 1997. In 
consequence the latter was as unexpected as it was radical.
Announcing the decision to create what has 
subsequently became the Financial Services Authority, the 
Chancellor said:
'[I]t is clear that the distinctions between different types of 
financial institution   banks, securities firms and insurance
companies   are becoming increasingly blurred. Many of today's 
financial institutions are regulated by a plethora of different
supervisors. This increases the cost and reduces the effectiveness of
supervision.'
In making the 'blurring the boundaries' argument the 
centrepiece of his justification for the government's new 
initiative, the Chancellor thus appeared to accept the
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arguments of those who had claimed there was a need for 
a radical overhaul of the financial regulatory system to 
reflect the new economic realities of the industry. The 
formation of the Financial Services Authority (FSA), and 
the associated statutory changes in the Financial Services 
and Markets Act (the Act), represented the government's 
response to these developments. The formation of a single 
regulatory authority, with oversight of the entire financial 
services sector, eliminated problems of regulatory 
jurisdiction in an environment in which the old, 
institutionally-based regulatory structure had become 
increasingly outmoded. The enactment of a single statute, 
the Act, reflected the reality that the existence of separate 
banking, securities, and insurance legislation to regulate 
fast integrating financial services sectors was becoming 
increasingly redundant, and possibly an obstacle to further 
beneficial change.
o
OTHER INFLUENCES ON THE 
LEGISLATION
Although this blurring of boundaries argument was 
undoubtedly influential, other factors were equally, if not 
more, important in giving the Act its final shape. At least as 
important as the desire to bring the regulatory structure 
up to date were three other considerations: the decision to 
award the Bank of England greater independence in the 
formulation ot monetary policy; the government's desire 
to end what it described as 'City self-regulation' and 
especially to respond to what it regarded as the scandal of 
the mis-selling of personal pensions; and the long standing 
desire on the part of the regulators, strongly supported by 
the new government, to obtain greater powers to combat 
financial crime. These different factors combined to give 
the Act a very different character to the one it would have 
had, had it merely been an attempt to introduce a 
modernised regulatory system.
CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE
Like the decision to create a single 'super-regulator', the 
decision to grant the Bank of England autonomy in 
monetary policy did not feature in the Labour party's 
election manifesto. On the other hand, the intellectual 
ground for this surprise move had been laid well in 
advance by a number of influential supporters of the case 
for central bank independence, including several former 
Conservative Chancellors of the Exchequer. Nevertheless, 
one issue that had received comparatively little prior 
attention was whether the Bank of England, as an 
independent central bank, should also conduct banking 
supervision. The evidence of other countries provided two 
different possible models.
The first, Federal Reserve, model stresses the synergies 
between the conduct of monetary policy and banking 
supervision. In particular, since banks are the conduits 
through which changes in short-term interest rates are
transmitted to the wider economy, the central bank needs 
to be concerned about their financial soundness as a 
precondition for an effective monetary policy. A subsidiary 
argument stresses the synergies which exist between the 
information needed for monetary policy purposes and that 
needed to assess the soundness of the banking system. The 
alternative, Bundesbank, model stresses instead the risks 
to the central bank of it directly conducting banking 
supervision. First, a central bank which is also responsible 
for supervision may err on the side of laxity if it fears that 
tight monetary conditions may lead to bank failures. 
Secondly, bank failures inevitably will occur and when they 
do they will be blamed on the supervisor. If the supervisor 
is the central bank its credibility will be undermined, and 
with it its credibility in the conduct of monetary policy. 
Thus the Bundesbank model stresses that the relationship
between the central bank and the banking supervisoro r
should be sufficiently distant to limit the scope for such 
'reputational contagion.'
The arguments for combination or separation of 
function were therefore finely balanced, and in practice 
the different arrangements are found in approximately 
equal measure in countries with independent central 
banks. However, in the British case two factors seem to 
have been decisive. First, as we have seen, the Labour party 
had a long history of being unimpressed by the Bank's 
capability as a bank regulator. This dated back to the 
debates on the first Banking Act, but was subsequently 
reinforced by episodes like BCCI and Barings, although 
neither episode resulted in a firm policy commitment to 
remove banking supervision from the Bank. Secondly, the 
Bank of England Act 1998 presented an opportunity to effect 
a transfer of powers under the Banking Act from the Bank 
to the Securities and Investments Board. (See Michael 
Blair et al, Blackstone's Guide to the Bank of England Act 
1998.) Hence the Act permitted the government to 
change the regulatory arrangements in a way which 
supported its general objective of modernising the system, 
but without the immediate need to establish a new- 
regulatory agency. Given the circumstances of a crowded 
legislative timetable, such an opportunity must have 
seemed very attractive to the Treasury ministers. Thus, 
shortly after the Bank was granted monetary policy 
independence, the government announced that it would 
also lose responsibility for banking supervision to what 
subsequently became the Financial Services Authority.
AN END TO 'SELF-REGULATION'
As we have seen, 'self-regulation' in its truest sense had 
ceased to exist in the City a decade and a half before the 
Act. Nonetheless, Labour party spokesmen criticised the 
decision in 1986 not to create a statutory securities 
commission in the UK, and continued to insist that, in the 
absence of such a body, the resulting system remained 
largely 'self-regulatory'. Bryan Gould, the party's then
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spokesman on City affairs, said in a parliamentary debate 
on the FS Bill that 'failure to put in place a proper 
independent statutory commission will be regretted by the 
government and is already being regretted by the City', 
and he also criticised the Conservative government for its 
failure to bring Lloyd's within the framework provided for 
bv the Bill. The characterisation of the arrangements
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brought in by the Act as 'self-regulatory' provided 
ammunition for opposition spokesmen as evidence 
emerged of various regulatory failings by the new agencies 
it had established, and the emerging scandals at Lloyd's 
cast doubt on the wisdom of exempting the insurance 
market from the Act's scope.
THREE CONSIDERATIONS
At least as important as the desire to bring the regulatory 
structure up to date were three other considerations: the 
decision to award the Bank of England greater 
independence in the formulation of monetary policy; 
the government's desire to end what it described as 'City 
self-regulation' and especially to respond to what it 
regarded as the scandal of the mis-selling of personal 
pensions; and the long standing desire on the part of the 
regulators, strongly supported by the new government, 
to obtain greater powers to combat financial crime.
PENSIONS SCANDAL
Of the various scandals that afflicted the Act regulators, 
none had a greater impact than the pensions mis-selling 
scandal. The Amis-selling issue concerned the wav in
o
which personal, portable pensions, introduced by the 
Conservative government in the mid-1980s, wereo '
marketed and sold. These pensions were provided through 
the life insurance companies, and were intended to be an 
alternative to occupational pensions which, it was argued, 
lead to rigidities in the labour market bv encouraging 
workers to remain with the same employer for long 
periods of time. The protection of individuals against the 
sale of unsuitable pension plan products was to have been 
provided by regulatory framework established by the Act 
which was completing its parliamentary passage at the 
same time as the legislation tor the new portable pensions. 
In the words of John Major, then a junior Treasury 
minister, the Act would 'safeguard people against the 
unscrupulous overselling of personal pensions.'
Approximately eight million personal pensions were sold 
in the UK between 1988 and 1995. Some were sold to 
people who were in occupational schemes and who were 
advised to transfer out of these schemes and to take out 
personal pensions in their place. For those prospective 
pensioners who were in well-funded schemes and where 
the prospective pension was protected against inflation, as 
was the case with many public sector employees, it would
be very difficult to argue that it was good advice to leave 
those schemes in favour of personal pensions with no 
employer contribution and an uncertain return. In at least 
some cases this mis-selling seems to have been due to the
o
fact that insurance company salesforces were poorly 
controlled and were remunerated on a commission-only 
basis, thus leading to high pressure sales tactics. These 
sales practices continued notwithstanding a regulatory 
regime that included as its key concepts best advice and 
suitability, both of which had been introduced into the 
regulatory framework as a way of regulating the sale of 
complex, packaged financial products like pensions.
Nonetheless, the extent of pensions mis-selling still 
remains a matter of dispute, and depends on a number of 
assumptions, for example about the investment return and 
the buyer's perceived financial needs at the time. 
Estimates of mis-selling have varied widely. When the issue 
first came to public prominence in 1993, a report 
commissioned by the Securities and Investment Board 
(SIB) suggested as many as 1.5 million pensions had been 
mis-sold with compensation costs amounting to some £4 
billion. Subsequently, these figures have been disputed by 
both the industry and some independent commentators, 
but the results of the subsequent regulatory review of the 
mis-selling cases suggests total compensation costs may be 
at least double the original estimate. There can be little 
doubt that, whatever the true scale of the problem, it did 
cause a significant loss of public confidence in personal 
pensions and in the system set up to regulate them.
The essence of the government's response to the mis- 
selling episode was to attribute it to the failings of self- 
regulation. The reason that mis-selling had not been 
detected and dealt with by regulators at a sufficiently early 
stage, it was argued, was because the self-regulatory 
organisations (SROs) failed to take adequate enforcement 
action. This was due to the fact that they were hamstrungJ o
by their industry-dominated boards. Meanwhile, the SIB 
lacked sufficient enforcement powers to ensure that 
appropriate regulatory actions were taken. The SIB 
possessed only the power to recognise a SRO, an option 
that was too draconian to be an effective basis for 
intervention. In the absence of the kinds of invention 
powers available to the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) in its dealings with its SROs, the SIB 
was thus constrained from ensuring that the SROs 
regulated in the public interest.
While this analysis can be disputed in a variety of ways, 
it formed the basis for the Labour party's conclusion, 
while in opposition, that the complex two tier system of 
the SIB and SROs needed to be replaced by a single, 
statutory body responsible for the regulation of all 
securities and investments business. Although the model 
most often cited was that of the US SEC, this overlooked 
that the latter body itself made substantial use of SROs. 
Instead, a completely unitary system was proposed in
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which the functions of the existing SROs would be 
absorbed into a reformed and enhanced SIB, reconstituted 
as a proper statutory body. This proposal formed the 
nucleus for what has subsequently become the FSA, 
although the latter has gained the important additions of 
banking, building society, and insurance regulation. 
Moreover, the FSA, like the SIB, remains a private 
company discharging a public function, and hence the 
proposal for a 'statutory commission' has never in actual 
fact been enacted.
DEALING WITH FINANCIAL CRIME
The third influential factor behind the new regime 
introduced by the Act derives from a long-standing senseJ o o
on the part of the financial services regulators that they 
lacked adequate powers to combat financial crime, 
especially market manipulation and insider dealing. For 
several years prior to Act in speeches made by its then 
chairman, Sir Andrew Large, the SIB argued that there 
were serious shortcomings in the investigation and 
disposal of cases of insider dealing and market abuse. In 
part these shortcomings were due to fragmented 
jurisdictions, with the SIB having no powers over market 
abuse resulting from the conduct of individuals who were 
not authorised persons under the Act. In part they were 
also due to the fact that such cases could only be 
prosecuted under the criminal law, with a criminal rather 
than a civil burden of proof. As Sir Andrew remarked:
PERSONAL PENSIONS
Approximately eight million personal pensions were sold 
in the UK between 1988 and 1995. Some were sold to 
people who were in occupational schemes and who were 
advised to transfer out of these schemes and to take out 
personal pensions in their place. For those prospective 
pensioners who were in well-funded schemes and where 
the prospective pension was protected against inflation, 
as was the case with many public sector employees, it 
would be very difficult to argue that it was good advice 
to leave those schemes in favour of personal pensions 
with no employer contribution and an uncertain return.
'[Ujnder the criminal system the evidential and public interest 
hurdles to be cleared before commencing a successful prosecution 
in the criminal courts are, quite correctly, high. But, as a result, 
activities which take place outside the scope of the regulators, 
whether the actions of company directors or end users of markets, 
mayjinish up not being taken to court. And since there is no 
sufficient civil alternative, what we would deem unacceptable 
actions jrom a regulatory viewpoint, and which we could often 
deal with if entered into by someone who was subject to 
regulation, can currently go unchallenged.' ('Standards of 
market integrity in the new world', speech delivered on 
29 October 1996)
In often complex cases with evidence that could only be 
interpreted on the basis of specialist knowledge, this 
meant that the number of prosecutions brought for market 
abuse was very small and convictions even less. The 
regulators spent several years pressing for a revision to the 
law that would permit them to dispose of cases of market 
abuse through civil rather than criminal channels. 
Significantly, this was one aspect of UK regulatory reform 
where its proponents seem to have drawn direct 
inspiration from US law and practice. This is the basis for 
the new Code of Market Conduct and the provisions of the
Act relating to the FSA's powers in relation to individuals o r
who breach that code.
This aspect of the Act has also proved to be the most 
controversial. It resulted in the draft Bill being criticised in 
an opinion of Lord Lester QC, commissioned by a Joint 
Committee of the Lords and Commons that had been 
established to scrutinise it, on the grounds that the 
proposed new regime was incompatible with the European 
Convention on Human Rights. It has resulted in the 
government introducing a number of important 
amendments, most notably to the proceedings of the 
proposed new Financial Services Tribunal which will now 
hear cases involving a breach of the Code of Market
o
Conduct at first instance. Moreover, the regime has now 
lost its 'civil' tag, which counsel's opinion had strongly 
argued was something of a misnomer.
In conclusion, the Act is an attempt to modernise the 
UK's regulatory system by reflecting the realities of the 
new financial landscape that has emerged over the last 
decade and a half. But it is also much more than this. In 
abolishing the SROs its aim is to remove some of the last
o
vestiges of the old self-regulatory practices of the City. In 
introducing a new regime for market abuse it aims also to 
ensure that the incidence of financial crime is reduced. It 
also reflects a changing role for the Bank of England, which 
has to a large extent lost its role as the City's 'head prefect'. 
The transfer of banking supervision to the FSA was simply 
the most striking example of how the old informal norms 
that once ruled the City, with the Bank as their accepted 
enforcer, have given way over the years to a regime based 
more explicitly on statute law and on detailed rules and 
regulations. The Act has been possible because the balance 
between statutory and self-regulation had long ago shifted 
decisively in favour of the latter. ©
Michael Taylor
'Blackstone's Guide to the Hnancial Services Act 2000', In Michael 
Blair, Loretta Min^hella, Michael Taylor, Mark Threipland and 
George Walker, was published bv Blackstone Press in September 
2000. This extract is reproduced with kind permission ot the 
publishers.
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